Mali’s fuel blockade reaches beyond the petrol queue

Mali’s government suspended school and university classes for two weeks from Oct. 27, 2025, after a fuel shortage. Reuters linked the disruption to attacks on tanker convoys by the al-Qaida-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known as JNIM. [1]

Schools in Bamako resumed classes Nov. 10, according to a Reuters report published Nov. 11. The two dates matter: the government had closed classrooms for a defined period, and reporters documented their reopening. [2]

The closure gives a concrete measure of the blockade’s reach. An assessment of security that counts territorial gains but omits lost school days leaves out a consequence that families experienced. Service continuity belongs alongside road access in any account of recovery.

A generator still needs a delivery

The U.S. International Trade Administration’s February 2026 energy guide says diesel generators supplied 66% of Mali’s electricity in 2023. It also describes businesses using generators to cope with unreliable grid supply. The generation share refers to 2023; it cannot serve as a current measurement. [3]

For a business using diesel backup, a grid failure and a fuel shortage require different responses. The owner can run the generator during an outage while fuel remains available. Buying a second diesel machine offers little protection against a shortage that affects both.

A useful continuity plan would identify the electricity needed for essential work, the fuel it consumes and the duration of an interruption it can withstand. Those questions apply to a clinic’s refrigeration or a workshop’s equipment without assuming that either site has a particular amount in reserve.

Drivers carry the danger

Human Rights Watch reported that JNIM fighters executed ten truck drivers and two teenage apprentices after a Jan. 29, 2026, attack on a military-escorted fuel convoy in the Kayes region. HRW interviewed 12 people remotely, including three witnesses, and geolocated video of burned tankers. [4]

HRW said JNIM claimed an attack on Malian troops that day but supplied no further details. Malian authorities did not answer HRW’s request for comment. These are the investigation’s findings and reported responses; Sahel Futures conducted no interviews or independent geolocation. [4]

A delivery count alone would conceal that human cost. Any account of restored supply should record harm to drivers and passengers as well as the fuel that reaches its destination. Publishing aggregate outcomes can support scrutiny without disclosing a convoy’s next departure.

Reducing fuel dependence

B2Gold says Fekola’s expanded solar installation entered full operational integration on March 31, 2025, and supplies about 28–30% of the mine’s annual electricity demand. Its power system also uses fuel and batteries. The percentage comes from the operator, not an independent engineering assessment. [5]

The relevant lesson for public services is a question of design: which essential tasks could use less delivered fuel? A project needs an assessment of demand, storage, maintenance and replacement costs. A mine’s annual electricity share cannot answer those questions for a hospital or school.

A public record of recovery should therefore include service interruptions and affordable access to fuel alongside deliveries. School attendance, cancelled services and days without essential supplies would make the result understandable to readers. Sahel Futures has not collected that dataset; these are proposed measures for future reporting.